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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SUM-
MARY PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE OF GOODS PURSUANT TO A
WRIT OF REPLEVIN HELD TO BE A DEPRIVATION OF PROP-
ER7Y WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW-In Fuentes v. Shevin' and its
companion case Parham v. Cortese,2 actions were filed challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes.
In a 4-3 decision3 the Supreme Court held that the failure to provide a
possessor of property with notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to
seizure of the property, under a writ of replevin, was a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
4
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
In Fuentes, appellant purchased, in two separate transactions, a stove
and stereo from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under conditional
sales contracts requiring monthly payments on the total bill of $600. Fire-
stone retained title to the goods while Fuentes was entitled to possession
conditioned on payment of the monthly installments. With only $200 re-
maining to be paid, Fuentes stopped making payments after a dispute arose
as to repair service on the stove. Firestone, thereupon, filed an action to re-
possess in a Florida small claims court. Concurrently, the company ob-
tained a writ of replevin ordering the sheriff to seize the goods. The prop-
erty was taken from Fuentes the same day.
To obtain the writ of replevin, Firestone had to file the repossession
action and apply for the writ before a court clerk, claiming that Fuentes
wrongfully detained the goods.5 The Florida statute additionally required
the posting of a bond in double the value of the property be replevied.6
1. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2. Id.
3. Justices Powell and Rehnquist not participating.
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of
. . . property without due process of law .. "
5. Fla. Stat. § 78.01, F.S.A. (1969):
Right to Replevin-Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully de-
tained by any other person or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover
them and any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful caption or deten-
tion as herein provided. Or such person may seek like relief, but with sum-
mons to defendant instead of replevy writ in which event no bond is required
and the property shall be seized only after judgment, such judgment to be in
like form as that provided when defendant has retaken the property on a
forthcoming bond. Notice of lis pendens to charge third persons with knowl-
edge of plaintiff's claim on the property may be recorded.
6. Fla. Stat. § 78.01, F.S.A. (1969):
Bond, requisites-Before a replevy writ issues, the plaintiff shall file a bond
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Thus, upon the ex parte application of Firestone, appellant Fuentes
was summarily relieved of the stove and stereo. She was given neither no-
tice of, nor opportunity to contest, the issuance of the writ before seizure.
Afterwards, she would have her day in court as the defendant in the re-
possession action. Her only course of interim action was to post within
three days of the seizure a counterbond with the sheriff for double the
value of the property. The sheriff was bound by the statute to hold the prop-
erty three days before delivering it to the applicant Firestone. 7 Firestone
was to have possession (unless a counterbond was posted by Fuentes) until
a final disposition as to title or right to possession was had in the underly-
ing action.
Fuentes subsequently filed suit in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of the Florida replevin statute on due process grounds. A
three judge court upheld the constitutionality of the procedure.8
Parham involved a similar challenge to the Pennsylvania replevin stat-
ute. As in Fuentes, none of the three appellants involved received any
advance notice of the seizure or an opportunity to contest it. Unlike Fuentes,
there were no civil actions to repossess filed by the creditors. 9
The Pennsylvania replevin procedure followed by the creditors was sim-
ilar in most respects to the Florida process. An ex parte application be-
fore an official'0 together with a bond in double the value of the property
to be replevied was the extent of the procedure. In Pennsylvania, how-
ever, the applicant did not have to claim an interest in the property nor
that the possessor had wrongfully detained it." Additionally, Pennsyl-
with surety payable to defendant to be approved by the clerk in at least
double the value of the property to be replevied conditioned that plaintiff
will prosecute his action to effect and without delay and that if defendant
recovers judgment against him in the action, he will return the property, if
return thereof is adjudged, and will pay defendant all sums of money recovered
against plaintiff by the defendant in the action.
7. Fla. Stat. § 78.13, F.S.A. (1969):
Writ; disposition of property levied on-The officer executing the writ shall
deliver the property to plaintiff after the lapse of three (3) days from the
time the property was taken unless within the three (3) days defendant gives
bond with surety to be approved by the officer in double the value of the prop-
erty as appraised by the officer, conditioned to have the property forthcoming
to abide the result of the action, in which event the property shall be rede-
livered to defendant.
8. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
9. The creditor/applicants in the Pennsylvania cases were Sears, Roebuck and
Company and the Government Employees Exchange Corporation.
10. A prothonotary rather than a clerk.
11- The procedural requirements for the issuance of a writ of replevin in Penn-
sylvania are set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 P.S. App.
R.C.P. § 1073 (1947):
Commencement of Action
(a) An action of replevin with bond shall be commenced by filing with the
prothonotary a praecipe for a writ of replevin with bond, together
with
(1) the plaintiff's affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied,
and
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vania, unlike Florida, did not require the filing of a repossession action as a
condition precedent to obtaining a writ of replevin.- Therefore, besides
denying a pre-seizure hearing, Pennsylvania did not even guarantee that
there would be a post-seizure hearing on the merits. 12 As in Florida, a Penn-
sylvania party could recover possession by posting a counterbond in double
the value of the property within three days of seizure.'
The Pennsylvania appellants filed suit in federal district court chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the replevin procedure on due process
grounds. A three judge court denied this challenge and upheld the process.1
4
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Replevin Analyzed
Writing the opinion for the majority of the Court,15 Justice Stewart
(2) the plaintiff's bond in double the value of the property, with se-
curity approved by the prothonotary, naming the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania as obligee, conditioned that if the plaintiff fails
to maintain his right of possession of the property, he shall pay to
the party entitled thereto the value of the property and all legal
costs, fees and damages sustained by reason of the issuance of the
writ.
(b) An action of replevin without bond shall be commenced by filing with
the prothonotary
(1) a praecipe for a writ of replevin without bond or
(2) a complaint.
If the action is commenced without bond, the sheriff shall not replevy the property but
at any time before the entry of judgment the plaintiff, upon filing the affidavit and
bond prescribed by subdivision (a) of this rule may obtain a writ of replevin with
bond, issued in the original action, and have the sheriff replevy the property.
12. Unless the applicant follows the procedure under 12 P.S. App. R.C.P. § 1073
(b)(2) (1947), the defendant will not get a post-seizure hearing at all unless he
initiates the action himself under 12 P.S. App. R.C.P. § 1073(a) (1947): If an action
is not commenced by a complaint, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant,
shall enter a rule upon the plaintiff to file a complaint. If a complaint is not filed
within twenty (20) days after service of the rule, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of
the defendant, shall enter a judgment of non pros. None of the applicants in the
Pennsylvania case filed a complaint for repossession.
13. 12 P.S. App. R.C.P. § 1076 (1947):
Counterbond
(a) A counterbond may be filed with the prothonotary by a defendant or
intervenor claiming the right to the possession of the property, except a
party claiming on a lien thereon, within seventy-two (72) hours after
the property has been replevied, or within seventy-two (72) hours after
service upon the defendant when the taking of possession of the prop-
erty by the sheriff has been waived by the plaintiff as provided by Rule
1077(a), or within such extension of time as may be granted by the
court upon cause shown.
(b) The counterbond shall be in the same amount as the original bond, with
security approved by the prothonotary, naming the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania as obligee, conditioned that if the party filing it fails to
maintain his right to possession of the property he shall pay to the
party entitled thereto the value of the property, and all legal costs, fees
and damages sustained by reason of the delivery of the replevied prop-
erty to the party filing the counterbond.
14. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
15. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall.
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examined the historical application and use of the writ of replevin. "Re-
plevin at common law was an action for the return of specific goods wrong-
fully taken or 'distrained'."' 16 Contrary to what has become popular belief,
the writ did not always issue out of a purely ex parte proceeding. 17 The
possessor could always stop the proceedings and challenge the seizure by
claiming ownership. Upon this challenge, the sheriff was empowered to sum-
marily determine ownership, and thus possession, pending final judgment in
the underlying action.' 8
Stressing the differences between the writ at common law and as used
today, Justice Stewart noted that previously the writ was used to recover
goods wrongfully taken or "distrained". In recent years its main usage has
been by creditors to recover goods rightfully taken but wrongfully detained.' 9
At common law the creditors' correct remedy would have been in either debt
or detinue, neither of which provided for seizure by color of law before a
final judgment. 20  Thus, on the only occasion in which the common law
sanctioned prejudgment seizure under color of law, notice and some kind of
summary hearing were given to the possessor.
Ascertaining that the common law offered no sanctuary to the defend-
ers of summary replevin, the Court discussed the constitutionality of pre-
judgment seizure of goods without prior notice and hearing.
B. Constitutional Right to Notice and Hearing Established
Examining procedural due process, the Court noted that for at least
the past century, "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must be notified. '21
Granted this right in every case,
16. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 78.
17. Id. at 79, where the Court quoted from 3 Holdsworth, History of English
Law 284 (1927):
[Tihe distrainor could always stop the action of replevin by claiming to be
the owner of the goods; and as this claim was often made merely to delay
the proceedings, the writ de proprietate probanda was devised early in the
fourteenth century which enabled the sheriff to determine summarily the
question of ownership. If the question of ownership was determined against
the distrainor the goods were delivered back to the distrainee pending final
judgment.
18. This also conflicts with Pennsylvania law which does not even require the
plaintiff to initiate a court action to determine title or right of possession, see supra
nn.ll and 12.
19. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 79.
20. Id., citing Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 362-65 (1956)
2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, 173-75, 203-11 (1909). Whereas
debt would have been proper to recover the value of the goods, detinue would have
been the proper action in the present cases where recovery of the goods was sought:
"DETINUE . . . a form of action which lies for the recovery, in specie, of personal
chattels from one who acquired possession of them lawfully, but retains it without
right, together with damages for the detention." Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th
Ed. 1968).
21. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 80, quoting from Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223
(1863).
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[I]t is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an op-
portunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."
'22
The issue was framed:
[W]hether procedural due process in the context of these cases
[dealing with state replevin statutes] requires an opportunity
for a hearing before the State authorizes its agents to seize prop-
erty in the possession of a person upon the application of an-
other.
2 8
The answer was, for the majority at least, in the affirmative.
The Court found that the purposes behind the constitutional right to be
heard were first, to ensure fair play to the individual and second, to pro-
tect his use and possession from arbitrary encroachment. 24  The sec-
ond was seen as the primary reason for the hearing requirement. The Court
said that an ex parte system acted to encourage unfounded applications-
through either mistake or outright fraud-while a system in which timely
notice and preliminary hearings were given would act, per se, to reduce such
applications:
[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided deter-
mination of facts decisive of rights . [and] no better in-
strument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it.
2 5
Justice Stewart then noted that since the prevention of unwarranted,
false deprivations of property was the aim of a hearing, it must be given
at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented-before the seizure.
While a later hearing may properly adjudge the respective rights of the par-
ties and, in a proper case, vindicate the possessor, the damage of the wrong-
ful seizure has already been done. This damage cannot be avoided in all
cases by a return of the property plus damages.
2 6
C. State Statutes Examined
After holding that prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing before
capture of property were constitutionally required, the Court examined the
22. ld., quoting from Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
23. Id. The state action needed for a violation of the Due Process clause was
obviously found in both the application to a state official and seizure by the sheriff
and was never discussed as a separate issue in the case.
24. Id. at 80-81.
25. Id. at 81, quoting from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 81-82. Both Florida and Pennsylvania provide for return of the prop-
erty if warranted by the underlying court action plus damages for the deprivation, if
any, to be taken out of the plaintiff's bond. Fla. Stat. § 78.07, F.S.A. (1969), supra
n.6 and 12 P.S. App. R.C.P. § 1073(a)(2) (1947), supra n.1l.
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Florida and Pennsylvania statutes in question and found them unable to pass
constitutional muster. The fact that the applicants had to allege a right to
possession of the property, 27 post a bond in double the value of the prop-
erty, and expose themselves to possible damages did not save the statutes.
Although these "safeguards" may have prevented some false claims, they
were no substitute for the constitutional right to prior notice and a hearing.
D. Property Interests Protected
"The right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to the deprivation
of an interest encompassed within the fourteenth amendment's protection.
28
The Court proceeded to discuss the relationship between the constitutional
right given and the length of seizure, the type of goods involved and the
property interest of the possessor.
1. Length of seizure
That the seizure of the goods may only be temporary-given the right to
file a counterbond, or considering that an underlying court action may
be pending-does not remove the capture from the protection of the four-
teenth amendment. 29 A temporary seizure would be just as violative of the
fourteenth amendment as a permanent one.30 The fact that the defendant
can reacquire the property by posting a large counterbond does not affect his
right to a prior hearing.
2. Type of property interest
The appellees contended that the defendants did not have full legal title
to the property but only a contractual right to possession and therefore were
beyond the ambit of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Stewart held that
these possessory interests were within the scope of the amendment:
The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "property," however,
has never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of un-
disputed ownership. Rather, it has been read broadly to extend
protection to "any significant property interest." . . . The
appellants were deprived of such an interest in the replevied goods
-the interest in continued possession and use of the goods.8 1
The fact that the creditors may have had an undisputed right to posses-
sion of the goods due to the default of the defendants was held to be imma-
terial:
27. Except Pennsylvania, see p. 230 infra.
28. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 84.
29. Id. at 84-86.
30. Id. A hearing would still be required although the type needed may be af-
fected by the length of the deprivation, see text accompanying n.61 infra.
31. Id. at 86, quoting from Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)
and citing Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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But even assuming that the appellants had fallen behind in their
installment payments, and that they had no other valid defense,
that is immaterial here. The right to be heard does not de-
pend on an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the
hearing. "To one who protests against the taking of his prop-
erty without due process of law, it is no answer to say that in
his particular case due process of law would have led to the same
result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits."'8 2
3. Type of goods
Justice Stewart found that a main reason for the decision of the courts
below was that, since the goods involved here-a stove, stereo, bed, table-
were not strictly "necessities" of life, they were not deserving of constitutional
protection. The Court found that the lower courts had based their reasoning
on too narrow a reading of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.a3 and Gold-
berg v. Kelly.34 The thrust of those cases was not that a hearing must be
held only before deprivation of "necessities" such as wages or welfare pay-
ments, but rather, that procedural due process requires a hearing before depri-
vation of any property. Although wages and welfare benefits were singled
out in those decisions, the operation of the due process clause does not turn
on the type of goods involved:
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally. And,
under our free enterprise system, an individual's choices in the
marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to
someone else. It is not the business of the court adjudicating
due process rights to make its own critical evaluation of those
choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are
"necessary".85
E. Extraordinary Situations
The majority of the Court recognized extraordinary situations in which
advance notice and right to a hearing may be dispensed with and summary
seizure allowed. Before this could occur, however, three factors must be
present:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a very special need for very prompt ac-
tion. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly
of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure had
been a governmental official responsible for determining, un-
32. Id. at 87, quoting from Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424
(1915).
33. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) which held that a hearing is required before a prejudg-
ment wage garnishment.
34. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) which required a hearing before the State could cut off
welfare benefits.
35. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 90.
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der the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was neces-
sary and justified in the particular instance. 3
Examples given of cases allowing such seizure without a prior hearing
included those in which the government had an interest,3' those where the
summary procedure was necessary to prevent an economic catastrophe dam-
aging to a large segment of the public, 38 and those in which summary cap-
ture was necessary for a court to preserve jurisdiction.89 The majority did
not find any elements of these extraordinary situations present in the cases
on appeal. An examination of the state statutes in question revealed that
they were not narrowly drawn to limit summary seizure to extraordinary
cases but in fact allowed it in routine instances.
The Court noted further 40 that, while time and money were indeed
saved by not providing for prior notice and hearings, these considerations
were not enough to eliminate the constitutional right:
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency
or accomodate all possible interest: it is intended to protect




The last argument considered by the Court was the contention that the
appellants had waived their rights to prior notice and a hearing through
clauses in the conditional sales contracts. 4 2  Although dictum, since
the statutes were held unconstitutional as written, the Court's reason-
ing will be persuasive in judging the validity of waiver clauses in the fu-
ture. The Court emphasized that there was no bargaining regarding
the contract clauses and that the parties were of unequal bargaining power-
essentially that these were contracts of adhesion. The appellants were
not made specifically aware of the "waiver" clause nor was its full
meaning adequately explained. Drawing an analogy from D.H. Over-
36. Id. at 91.
37. Id. at 92; supra n.24 where the Court cited and quoted from Phillips v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931) (summary seizure of
property to collect federal taxes allowed): "Delay in the judicial determination of
property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be
immediately satisfied." (emphasis omitted).
38. Summary seizure incident to a bank failure allowed. Id. at 92 n.26, citing
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); see Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928).
39. Id. at 91; n.23, citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
40. Id. at 90; supra n.22.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 94. Mrs. Fuentes' contract provided that "in the event of default of
any payment or payments, seller at his option may take back the merchandise .. "
Similarly, the Pennsylvania contracts provided that the seller "may retake" or "re-
possess" the merchandise if the buyer defaulted. All were standard clauses in printed,
form contracts with no explanatory material.
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meyer v. Frick,43 a recent case involving a waiver of due process rights
in a contract between two corporations relatively equal in bargaining
power, the Court said that in the instant cases the situation of the parties
and the naked terms of the contract militated against a valid waiver.
44
III. THE DISSENTING OPINION
A. State Court Argument
Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, dis-
sented from the majority opinion. The first part of his short dissent
propounded the view that the appellants did not belong in federal court.
He felt that under Younger v. Harris,45 appellants should have raised their
constitutional objections in the underlying state actions.46
B. Creditor Protection Needed
The second half of the dissent was aimed at the merits of the case.
Justice White was of the opinion that the replevin statutes in question
adequately protected the competing interests of the possessor/buyer and
the applicant/seller. The seller was interested in protecting the goods
from possible harm and deterioration through continued use, while the
buyer was interested in continued use and possession. The pro-
cedure in question, Justice White reasoned, furthered the seller's in-
terest by preventing use by the buyer pending court determination of their
respective rights, while the buyer, although losing interim use, would be
made whole through damages taken out of seller's bond if he prevailed in
the underlying action.
4 7
The dissent said that the practical considerations of the normal
replevin case opposed imposition of a constitutional requirement of
43. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
44. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 95, 96.
45. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The case involved the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act. Harris was indicted under the Act and while the state proceeding was pending
brought suit in federal court to enjoin Younger, the district attorney, from prosecuting
him alleging the unconstitutionality of the Act. The Court held that the possible un-
constitutionality of the state statute on its face did not in itself justify federal inter-
vention. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, indicated
that the state proceeding was the proper forum for the defendant's objections. It is
worthy of note that Justice Brennan, the author of the above opinion, did not share
Justice White's view in the applicability of Younger to the present cases and was in
the majority here.
46. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 97-99 (White, J., dissenting). Under this
view Mrs. Fuentes should have objected to the seizure on due process grounds in the
repossession action instituted by Firestone in the Florida court and pending at the time
of her action in federal court. Apparently the dissent would require the appellants in
Parham to take the steps necessary to institute an action in the Pennsylvania court,
since no actions had been filed by the creditors, supra n.12.
47. Id. at 99-100.
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notice and preliminary hearing. Reasoning that the purpose of the hear-
ing was "to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of the property,"48
Justice White stated that in the usual case the buyer has either defaulted or
not-and if he has "it would seem not only 'fair', but essential, that
the creditor be allowed to repossess. . .. -49 The dissent indicated
that the likelihood of a false claim of default was not sufficiently serious
to warrant more protection than the replevin laws in question already
required-allegations of ownership and posting of a bond.50
In the final analysis, Justice White felt that the statutes allowing pre-
judgment seizure upon allegation of a right to possession and posting of
a bond met the minimum standards of procedural due process required
in these types of cases. He agreed with the majority that no specific type
of hearing was required by due process.51 He differed, however, with
the majority opinion that some type of hearing was always required.52 In-
stead, he felt that in certain cases protection could be given without a
formal type of adversary hearing, especially where, as here, a bond was
posted and access to a post-seizure hearing on the merits was provided.
The object of Justice White's solicitude was the creditor: "Surely un-
der the Court's own definition, the creditor has a 'property' interest as de-
serving of protection as that of the debtor." 53
C. Disadvantages in Majority Holding
The dissent saw two distinct disadvantages to the majority holding.
First, the holding offered little, if any, new protection to buyer/posses-
sors. Under the majority's reasoning, creditors could avoid prior no-
tice and hearing by merely spelling out in the contract the procedure
that will be followed for seizure upon default. 54  Second, the added re-
sponsibilities put on the creditor may well result in either a reduction in the
availability of credit or higher credit charges. 55
D. Impact on the Uniform Commercial Code
Justice White felt that the majority was wrong in rejecting what
they said was an outmoded concept. In recent years the Uniform Com-
48. Id. at 100.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 100-01.
51. id. at 101-02.
52. See text accompanying nn.60-64, infra.
53. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 95-96, referring to the statement of Justice Stewart:
The conditional sales contracts here simply provided that upon a default the
seller 'may take back', 'may retake' or 'may repossess' merchandise. The con-
tracts included nothing about the waiver of a prior hearing. They did not
indicate how or through what process-a final judgment, self-help, prejudg-
ment replevin with a prior hearing, or prejudgment replevin without a prior
hearing-the seller could take back the goods.
55. Id. at 103.
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mercial Code has completely revamped the area of secured transactions.
It contains a provision for seizure of goods by a creditor without judi-
cial proceedings:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a se-
cured party may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.
56
Justice White felt that summary seizure was a viable concept and if ac-
cepted by the Uniform Commercial Code should be accepted here.
Rather than acquiesce in what he felt was a revolutionary departure
in debtor-creditor cases,5 7 Justice White was:
[C]ontent to rest on the judgment of those who have wrestled
with these problms so long and often and upon the judgment
of the legislatures, that have considered and so recently adopted
provisions that contemplate precisely what has happened in
these cases.58
IV. COMMENT
In reading Fuentes it is easy to give a somewhat overly broad
interpretation to the majority opinion. At first blush a reader can get
either of the following impressions: first, that all replevin writs are
now outlawed or, second, that no seizure of property is valid unless
preceded by notice and a preliminary hearing. Neither of these is neces-
sarily true.
In simple terms, this decision declares that in the case of a replevin
of consumer goods from an unsophisticated buyer/possessor, proce-
dural due process demands that he be given notice and an opportunity to
be heard before the goods are seized by the sheriff. Replevin of goods
other than consumer goods and replevin of consumer goods from
knowledgeable buyer/possessors are presumably valid without prior no-
tice and hearing.5 9
56. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503 (1962). The recent 1972 amendments
have made no changes in this section.
57. The majority opinion said that today's decision was "in the mainstream of the
past cases" dealing with procedural due process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 88.
58. Id. at 103.
59. In support of this construction of the, holding of Fuentes, the reader is re-
ferred to the discussion of "consumer goods" id. at 88-90; and to the approving dis-
cussion of the Overmyer case, id. at 94-96, involving a waiver by "knowledgeable"
corporations. "Sophisticated" is used here to denote someone who is knowledgeable in
business practices and the related law, i.e., when these people waive their right to notice
and a hearing they know they are waiving a constitutional right and subjecting
themselves to prejudgment seizure through a summary replevin writ. "Unsophisticated"
is used to refer to the "ordinary" consumer who is not so knowledgeable. It is sub-
mitted that it would be hard to envision any business or businessman as "unsophisti-
cated" while of course, many non-business individuals are certainly "knowledgeable".
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Another conclusion which might be drawn from the holding is that a
full, trial-type hearing on the merits is required before every seizure. Again,
this is not necessarily true.
The majority indicated a number of factors which would bear on
the type and form of hearing required. First, the existence of "[o]ther,
less effective safeguards . .."60 such as a bond requirement or an alle-
gation under oath of a right to possession would demand a less for-
mal hearing. Second, the length and character of the deprivation has a
bearing on the form of hearing required-an opportunity to file a
counterbond to recover the goods may call for a less comprehensive
hearing.61  Third, the simplicity of the issues is relevant in determin-
ing the character of the hearing. For example, where default is the only
issue, a summary type of hearing would only be necessary.6 2  Fourth,
the type and value of the property involved may have a bearing on
the form of the required hearing-perhaps the type of hearing given
could be based on a cost scale with more formal hearings being held for
more expensive property.63 Fifth, the aggregate cost and delay incident
to the hearing requirement will naturally have an impact on the type used.
6 4
There are, of course, other factors not mentioned by the Court which
would weigh on the form of hearing required. For example, the char-
acter of the property-such as perishable goods-might require only a sum-
mary type of hearing. Another point to remember is that the Court
itself acknowledged that there are "extraordinary situations" in which
summary proceedings with no hearing are appropriate.65  Added to
these situations may be instances where the creditor can get summary
seizure without a hearing by alleging and offering proof that the debtor
will destroy or conceal the goods.
Theoretically, the holding of the majority, that prior notice and
a hearing before seizure are required, is appealing, but, as the dissent
indicates, 66 its practical effect may be to offer no new protection for
consumers. Creditors are sure to take advantage of the main "loop-
hole" in the Court's opinion which allows summary seizure when a
60. Id. at 83-84. These "safeguards" of course, are not enough to obviate the
hearing requirement entirely, see p. 233 inlra.
61. Id. at 86. Of course, even temporary seizures demand some type of hearing,
see p. 234 infra.
62. Id. at 86-87; supra n.18. The existence or nonexistence of defenses will not,
however, entirely remove the hearing requirement, supra n.32.
63. ld. at 89-90, supra n.21. This is not to say that the type or value of
property will determine if there is to be a hearing-all property will get the protec-
tion; but only that the value may dictate, to some extent, the form of the hearing.
64. Id. at 96-97, n.33. Of course, cost and delay have no effect on the constitu-
tional right to a prior hearing, see p. 236 infra.
65. See p. 235 infra.
66. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 102-03 (White, J., dissenting).
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proper waiver clause is used. This means that if the clause explicitly
states that prejudgment replevin without a hearing will be used and the
buyer is apprised of the fact that he is waiving his constitutional right
to a prejudgment hearing with notice, seizure can be accomplished with-
out such procedural requirements. 67 While it is not argued and prob-
ably not arguable that constitutional rights may not be waived by con-
tract,68 it is submitted that unless the Court acts to plug this "loophole"
the decision will lose much of its intended effect.
To put the needed teeth into this holding the Court should not
merely look into the facts of each case or examine the text of the waiver
clause to determine if a hearing is required. Rather, they should base the
requirements of notice and hearing in each case on whether the buyer
is sophisticated or unsophisticated.69  This could be done by the out-
lawing or disregarding of such waiver clauses in ordinary consumer
contracts. Thus, a hearing would always be required when an unso-
phisticated buyer is involved, but not when a sophisticated buyer is
involved. This method, it is submitted, is the only way to fully pro-
tect the ordinary consumer and, when considered together with the lim-
iting factors on the type of hearing suggested by the Court, would not
strip the creditor of a quick and valuable remedy.70
In the dissent, Justice White correctly points out the main weak-
ness of the majority opinion-the waiver "loophole". In trying to
protect creditors, however, he fails to take into account that there are un-
scrupulous dealers who do use ex parte replevin procedures to harass
innocent buyers who have legitimate complaints. 71 Although it must be
aware of the abuses in the present system, the dissent, in its solicitude
for creditors, would require no pre-seizure hearings at all. The majority,
on the other hand, while protective of debtors, still gives creditors consid-
eration by limiting the hearing requirement to replevin of consumer goods
from unsophisticated debtors, exempting certain "extraordinary situations"
and listing a number of limiting factors upon the form of the hearing re-
quired. Certainly, no one would argue that the creditor does not have a
"[p]roperty interest as deserving of protection as that of the debtor, z72 but
while the majority makes an effort to accommodate the competing interests
67. Supra n.54.
68. See, e.g., Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972) and Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. at 96 n.31.
69. Supra n.59 and accompanying text.
70. But see Due Process in Consumer Cases: Fuentes v. Shevin, VI Clearing-
house Review 7, 418, 420-21 (1972) where a prior hearing on the validity of the
waiver is suggested. It is felt that basing the requirements on the type of person
involved rather than on the type of waiver used is a better way to implement the deci-
sion, although the result will be the same in most cases.
71. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 99-102 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 102.
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(through use of the suggested procedure together with the limiting factors
already discussed), the dissent makes no such effort.
V. ILLINOIS LAW
The Illinois statute on replevin is essentially similar to both the
Florida and Pennsylvania statutes held unconstitutional in Fuentes. It pro-
vides for an action of replevin whenever goods have been wrongfully dis-
trained, or otherwise wrongfully taken or shall be wrongfully detained.
• .., In order to obtain a writ, the applicant must file a petition alleging
ownership of the property or a right to immediate possession and that
the property is being wrongfully held by the defendant. 74  Additionally,
the applicant must post a bond in double the value of the property to be
replevied. 75
Unlike the other statutes, the Illinois law does not require the
sheriff to hold the property for three days, but requires him to turn it over
promptly to the applicant7 6 unless a counterbond is filed by the defend-
ant.77  The Illinois creditor is required to institute an underlying ac-
tion to determine his title or right to the goods78 and failure to do so
will cause a return of the property to the defendant and subject the appli-
cant to damages. 79
The "safeguards" built into the Illinois statute-allegation of own-
ership and a large bond-are clearly insufficient to save it in the face of
Fuentes.8 0  The other provision-allowing the defendant to reclaim the
goods through a counterbond-is of even less effect since the sheriff is
required to deliver the goods "forthwith" to the applicant without any hold-
ing period.81 While the other statutes allowed the defendant three days in
which to raise the counterbond8 2 an Illinois defendant must surrender the
goods unless he has the money readily available. The only redeem-
ing aspect of the Illinois statute is that the applicant must pursue an ac-
tion to determine his right to the goods. This, however, is also inade-
quate to spare the statute. Further, the statute provides that "the clerk
shall issue the writ of replevin upon request of the plaintiff."83  The crux
of the Courts opinion is that the unchallenged word of a self-serving appli-
73. 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 119, § 1 (1971).
74. Id. § 4.
75. Id. § 10.
76. Id. § 14.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 10.
79. Id. § 22.
80. See p. 232 infra.
81. Ifl. Rev. Stat. ch. 119, § 14 (1971).
82. See supra nn.7, 13 and accompanying text.
83. Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 119, § 5 (1971).
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cant, no matter how well-intentioned, is insufficient to obviate the consti-
tutional requirements of notice and preliminary hearing.
It is beyond the scope of this note to suggest a new statute for ili-
nois, however, a few general statements may be made.
First, it is urged that the Illinois courts follow the path suggested-
outlawing waiver clauses in consumer contracts and providing for pre-
liminary hearings before prejudgment replevin whenever an unsophis-
ticated buyer is involved. 84 The type and form of the hearing will vary.85
Second, to bring the statute within Fuentes, considerable narrowing is
needed. A hearing should be provided in every case except for certain
enumerated exceptions: 1) the extraordinary situations mentioned by the
Court;86 2) instances where the applicant alleges, with some proof, that
defendant will destroy or conceal the goods; 3) cases where perishable goods
are involved.
Third, whenever a waiver is involved, the hearing should con-
cern the validity of the waiver. The opinion leaves open the possibility
that an allegation of a valid waiver might be enough to preclude a hear-
ing87 but this is not clear and a hearing should be required.
The precise impact of Fuentes upon the Illinois law is, of course,
not yet clear. It is clear however, that unless the statute is narrowed con-
siderably, the ancient writ of replevin will die in Illinois.
JERRY WEBB
84. See p. 239 infra.
85. Supra nn. 60-65 and accompanying text.
86. See p. 235 infra.
87. See p. 236 infra.
